Competition - Freedom to provide services - Anti-doping legislation adopted by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) - Purely sporting legislation.

Case T-313/02 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities (Competition – Freedom to provide services – Anti-doping rules adopted by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) – Purely sporting rules) Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber), 30 September 2004 Summary of the Judgment 1.     Community law – Scope – Sport – Limitation to economic activities (Art. 2 EC) 2.     Freedom of movement of persons and services – Workers – Competition – Treaty provisions – Scope – Sporting activities – Limits – Anti-doping rules – Not included (Arts 39 EC, 49 EC, 81 EC and 82 EC) 1.     Having regard to the objectives of the Community, sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 EC. (see para. 37) 2.     Where a sporting activity takes the form of paid employment or a provision of remunerated service, it falls within the scope of Article 39 EC et seq. or of Article 49 EC et seq. Therefore, the prohibitions laid down by those provisions of the Treaty apply to the rules adopted in the field of sport which concern the economic aspect which sporting activity can present. On the other hand, those prohibitions do not affect purely sporting rules, that is to say rules concerning questions of purely sporting interest and, as such, having nothing to do with economic activity. That restriction on the scope of the above provisions of the Treaty must however remain limited to its proper objective. Those principles, extracted as regards the application to sporting regulations of the Treaty provisions in respect of the freedom of movement of persons and services, are equally valid as regards the Treaty provisions relating to competition. The fact that purely sporting rules may have nothing to do with economic activity, with the result that they do not fall within the scope of Articles 39 EC and 49 EC, means, also, that they have nothing to do with the economic relationships of competition, with the result that they also do not fall within the scope of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC. Conversely, rules which, although adopted in the field of sport, are not purely sporting but concern the economic activity which sport may represent fall within the scope of the provisions both of Articles 39 EC and 49 EC and of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC and are capable, in an appropriate case, of constituting an infringement of the liberties guaranteed by those provisions. Since the prohibition of doping is based on purely sporting considerations and therefore has nothing to do with any economic consideration, the rules to combat doping laid down by sports organisations do not come within the scope of the Treaty provisions on the economic freedoms and, in particular, of Articles 49 EC, 81 EC and 82 EC. (see paras 39-42, 47) JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fourth Chamber)30 September 2004(1) (Competition – Freedom to provide services – Anti-doping rules adopted by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) – Purely sporting rules) applicants, v defendant, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCEOF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Fourth Chamber), gives the following On those grounds, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fourth Chamber) Legal Tiili Vilaras H. Jung H. Legal Registrar President 1 – Language of the case: French.